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AFTER
Rationalism
Is 'economic rationalism' really about economics? 
Tony Asprotnourgos is unsure. Is it rational? Probably 
not. But he cautions that its failings don't let its critics off 
the economic hook.
s an economist, the rise of 'economic 
rationalism' in Australia in the 1980s 
was a source of some bemusement 
and irritation to me. I do not know 
precisely what it is. I am not sure that it is 
economics, but I am certain that it is not rational.
I have the impression that the term—used to embrace a 
loose collection of policy views with no very obvious unify­
ing core—has had the effect (whatever the intention) of 
conveying to the general public the conception that in some 
sense this grab-bag of policies carried the imprimatur of 
economic science. This is the irritating aspect of 'economic 
rationalism'. Even if one remains entirely within the con­
fines of orthodox (marginalist) economics, it is not evident 
*hat th eo retica l econom ics endorses 'econom ic 
rationalism'. The academic economists and other economic 
Professionals' or 'experts' who are regularly dragged out 
of their cupboards and draped over a microphone, or 
broadsheet, to endorse 'economic rationalism' are very lit­
tle different from the clergy of earlier (and some current) 
generations who bless the canons of one side or another of 
various conflicts—in our case, public policy conflicts.
This is not to say that economists do not have the right to 
participate in public policy debate—they have as much 
right as anybody else. But they should not be permitted to 
get away with projecting views which are essentially a 
product of their wider political and social values, rather 
than their professional expertise, as if those views had the 
status of scientific or some other intellectual authority. In 
fact, their wider social and political values are of no greater 
interest than those of an unemployed manufacturing 
worker in Wangaratta or Wollongong.
Much the same could be said of the economic journalists 
who cultivate an image of residing above the myriad of 
vested or particular economic interests and offering 
'unsoiled' advice, presumably in the service of some 'com­
mon good' or 'national interest'. Yet this common interest, 
\ if it exists, remains entirely unelaborated in their entirely
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derivative writings. In fact, these self-proclaimed crusaders 
are no more devoid of particular interests and controver­
tible social values than anyone else.
To a large extent, then, 'economic rationalism' is actually a 
product of social and political values rather than economic 
science. Thus an explanation for its rise to dominance must 
be sought elsewhere than in economics alone. I do not mean 
by this to absolve academic economics of all culpability. Yet 
to locate the problem in the university training of our 
bureaucrats or businesspeople is too easy. Those who 
believe that the dominant economic beliefs of the ruling 
elites—either in government or private business—are lar­
gely derived from their university training in economics 
need to explain how it happens that academic economists 
(whatever their other defects) on average are considerably 
less conservative than their former (or current) students. It 
would be obvious to any academic of even moderate per­
ception that the social values of those who pass through the 
academy on their way to joining the elites are already 
solidly formed before they enter the academy. Of those who 
enter with such conservative beliefs, most leave with them 
largely intact. In short, it is not good enough merely to point 
the finger at 'economics'.
For in truth economic science provides little warrant for any 
economic policies of any kind. To the extent that economics 
limits itself to explanatory propositions about how 
economies actually behave, it can say little about desirable 
policies— only, at most, that if certain policy levers are 
pulled, then certain outcomes will result. In this purely 
explanatory realm, orthodox economic analysis is indeed 
deeply suspect; but that is not the point I wish to pursue 
here.
Yet despite these various misapprehensions there is a con­
nection between orthodox economics and the bundle of 
policies associated with the term 'economic rationalism'. 
On one definition the core of 'economic rationalism' is the 
notion that competition and 'flexibility' of market processes 
will produce optimal economic outcomes— or at least, su­
perior outcomes to any other (government-manipulated) 
regime. Yet again this is far from self-evident. A number of 
related postulates are required for a proposition like this to 
be plausible. Explaining them is somewhat technical, but 
worth following.
Even in the limited domain of price and wage flexibility, 
prices would have to simultaneously achieve three distinct 
goals. On the production side, market processes would 
have to proportion prices to costs. At the same time, on the 
demand side, prices would have to adjust so as to ensure 
that supplies balance demands and markets 'clear'. Finally, 
the resulting prices would have to exhibit certain additional 
optimal properties; in particular, prices would have to fully 
incorporate all social costs and benefits of economic ac­
tivity. It turns out to be remarkably difficult to demonstrate 
just how market processes are to generate these various 
results.
Two examples may help to illustrate the difficulties in­
volved. The first is related to the public debate on tariff
policy and the best allocation of national economic resour­
ces. Here the usual procedure adopted by the 
econometricians is to assume full employment, and then 
analyse the possible alternative outcomes from reallocating 
those fully employed resources to different uses. (All the 
models contrived by the Industry Commission are of this 
kind.) The notion that resources (and in particular labour) 
in previously protected industries might find no alternative 
use is simply not taken seriously. Yet, to put the point 
mildly, it may not be so easy to transform a middle-aged 
male manufacturing worker in Geelong into a waitress in a 
Japanese restaurant in Cairns. If this is rationality, economic 
irrationality must be terrifying.
‘It is not good enough 
merely to point the finger ot 
“economics,,.,
The other example is the parallel public debate over 
deregulation policy and the economic role of competition 
in general. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that a 
completely deregulated and competitive economy will 
generate superior social outcomes to a regulated and non­
competitive system. This does not guarantee that any par­
ticular deregulatory reform aimed at providing greater 
competition will improve social welfare. The economic 
'Theory of Second Best' upon which this conclusion rests is 
highly abstract, but the following illustration helps to sug­
gest its significance.
Suppose that both rail and road freight are subsidised and 
cost inefficient. Suppose also, following the logic of or­
thodox economics, that removing subsidies from the costs 
of both rail and road freight will generate a superior social 
outcome. It nevertheless may easily be the case that if one 
removes subsidies from rail freight, but leaves road sub­
sidies unchanged, the result will actually be greater inef­
ficiency and thus a worse social outcome. Why? Because if 
rail freight becomes relatively more expensive than road 
freight, the effect will be to encourage more resources into 
road freight—and this will lead to an inferior, rather than 
superior, allocation of resources. In other words, removing 
subsidies from rail freight while subsidising road freight, 
according to this analysis, is actually worse than the situa­
tion of subsidising both.
It would not be all that difficult to provide a comprehensive 
and devastating critique of orthodox economic notions of 
the ability of the market mechanism to efficiently and spon­
taneously direct resources to the best ends—notions which 
underpin (albeit in vulgarised forms) the rationales for 
'economic rationalism' in Australia. But that sort of critique 
would suffer from the intrinsic limitation of any negative 
argument: repudiating one set of arguments for a policy 
position does not remove the possibility that another set of 
quite valid arguments exists for the same policy. Or, to put
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the same point slightly differently a sufficient rationale 
may not be, at the same time, a necessary rationale.
This brings us to the real core of economic policy debate in 
Australia today. We are confronted with a fundamental 
dilemma. On the one hand we need a growth rate of the 
economy capable of systematically reducing unemploy­
ment towards the ultimate goal of full employment. On the 
other hand, and at the same time, we need to stabilise 
foreign debt and our current account deficit at levels which 
are sustainable. This means, in rough terms, that we need 
a persistent real GDP growth rate of upwards of 3.5-4% at 
the same time as generating a trade surplus of around 1.5% 
of GDP. The crucial question here is whether it is possible 
to achieve these results by relying wholely on the spon­
taneous mechanism of market forces. It is because I do not 
believe that spontaneous market forces are capable of 
generating these results that I favour interventionist in­
dustrial policies.
The dramatic changes in structural economic policy 
wrought by the Hawke and Keating governments since 
1985-86 have essentially—if not entirely consciously— 
been driven by this fundamental difficulty of reconciling 
full employment growth and long run external balance. 
The internationalisation of the economy and aspects of 
deregulation have been driven by this imperative. That it 
is of prime importance to generate a persistent trade 
surplus of the order of magnitude indicated above— if full 
employment is ever to be revived as a serious policy objec­
tive— is at least loosely understood, and accepted, across 
the political spectrum. Less widely understood, particular­
ly on the Left, is that this also has definite and largely 
inescapable implications for the balance between public 
sector expenditure and revenue, and thus for the level of 
public expenditure itself.
Why is this so? The current account deficit is by definition 
equal to the private sector deficit plus the public sector 
deficit. In other words, Australia's deficit with the rest of 
the world is equal to the excess of our expenditure over our 
income in the public and private sectors taken together. 
Hence, if government policy is aimed towards achieving a 
desired current account bailance and a desired level of 
private investment—as is presently the case— then (given 
a certain level of private saving) this very largely deter­
mines the balance between income and expenditure in the 
public sector. In other words, if the current account is a 
primary target of government policy, the level of expendi­
ture in the public sector is directly constrained by that 
policy objective. And this is true for the public sector as a 
whole; that is to say, all of the three tiers of government, 
including government trading enterprises. The conse­
quences of this, though real, are unpalatable to many on 
the Left.
This much is clear at the level of principle. In practice, 
public sector budgetary restraint has become synonymous 
With expenditure restraint, not least because of the current 
government/opposition bidding war on tax cuts. But 
budgetary restraint could equally well be achieved 
through tax increases. This would mean shifting the bur­
den of economic restraint towards the reduction of private 
consumption and/or investment. (However, the reduction 
of private investment is obviously economically unattrac­
tive, unless it is somehow or other the result of efficiency 
gains.)
I cannot conclude without a note of warning. I have argued 
above that the bundle of economic policies described as 
'economic rationalism' lacks any robust general rationale 
in economic theory. This may be of some comfort for the 
Left, given that this selfsame range of policies stands at 
odds with many of its traditional beliefs. However, this 
does not somehow absolve the Left from the real policy 
dilemma I outlined above. In particular it should not 
obscure the fact that any plausible policy stance by the Left 
must be dominated by the two compelling requirements I 
outlined above. The first is that we require a trade surplus 
which allows both employment growth and the stabilisa­
tion of foreign debt as a percentage of GDP. The second is 
a public sector budget in line with the level of private 
investment and private savings, and with the aforemen­
tioned trade surplus (and, by implication, the current ac­
count deficit).
'Economic rationalism' is a vague and rubbery term which 
covers a multitude of intellectual and ethical sins. But this 
is no excuse for dismissing every policy associated with the 
term out of hand. It does not remove the necessity for the 
Left to consider case by case the usefulness of various 
policies which find a place under this idiotic rubric. The 
alternative is to make the same mindless error as our 
adversaries—an irrational a priori commitment to all the 
policies clustered under 'economic rationalism' confront­
ing an equally irrational a priori rejection of all those same 
policies. The policies labelled as 'economic rationalism' are 
not a seamless robe of indivisible doctrine. Many of them 
may be the result of blind economic faith or prejudice. But 
equally some may be the result of compelling economic 
forces.
The Left needs to debate these issues further. In doing so it 
should not lose sight of two further considerations. First, 
no political body of opinion can ignore the economic con­
straints now confronting Australia and hope to remain a 
relevant intellectual force in public policy debate. There is 
a widespread diffidence, not to say antipathy, on the Left 
towards econom ics as such. For some, 'econom ic 
rationalism' seems to be simply a synonym for economic 
analysis. Second, elaborate critiques of market processes 
and powerful arguments for their failure are not sufficient 
to justify vaguely conceived policies of government inter­
vention. There is government failure as well, as the Vic­
torian experience of the 1980s makes transparently clear. It 
is necessary to provide policy responses which are 
reasonably likely to generate superior outcomes—and this 
in turn requires a more thoroughgoing commitment to 
policy debate and development.
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